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The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance
*
 
Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good 
government and consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership 
matters, then understanding what motivates individuals to become politicians and perform 
competently in office becomes a central question. In this paper, we examine whether higher 
wages attract better quality politicians and improve political performance using exogenous 
variation in the salaries’ of local legislators across Brazil’s municipal governments. The 
analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional 
amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal 
population. Our main findings show that increases in salaries not only attracts more 
candidates, but more educated ones. Elected officials are in turn more educated and stay in 
office longer. Higher salaries also increase legislative productivity as measured by the 
number of bills submitted and approved, and the provision of public goods. 
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Governments that secure property rights, regulate entry less, and curb corruption are thought to
create the right incentives for economies to prosper.1 But while the virtues of good government
for economic development and growth are widely acknowledged, what determines the quality of
government is much less clear. One predominant view in the literature argues that political institu-
tions that restrict rent-seeking and promote electoral accountability shape the necessary incentives
for good policy-making. However, political institutions can only partially explain the variation in
the quality of government both across countries and over time.2 A complementary view is that
the quality of policy-making depends on the honesty and competence of the political class (Besley
(2006)). Recent empirical evidence suggests that leaders play an important role in enacting the
right policies and aﬀecting economic performance (Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2007; Jones and
Olken 2005). But if the characteristics of policy-makers matter, then it is important to understand
what attracts high quality politicians into oﬃce and what provides them with the incentives to
perform according to voters preferences.
Politicians have a variety of motivations for holding public oﬃce. Some derive personal satis-
faction from being in power or experience an intrinsic beneﬁt based on a sense of civic duty; others
desire to implement their preferred policies because of ideology or to satisfy special interest groups.3
For many, however, monetary rewards are the principal motivation. In eﬀect, a growing theoretical
literature has shown that increases in monetary incentives aﬀect both the type of politician that
run for oﬃce as well as their performance. Yet, in contrast to the standard eﬃciency wage model,
which justiﬁes higher levels of compensation as a way to align incentives and encourage positive
selection into ﬁrms, the beneﬁts of increasing monetary rewards are not as clear in a political set-
1See North (1981); De Long and Schleifer (2003); Knack and Keefer (1995).
2In their account of the success story of Botswana, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003) conjecture that good
institutions played an important role in Botswana’s performance. Nevertheless, they also attribute a key role to “a
number of important and farsighted decisions by the post-independence political leaders, in particular Seretse Khama
and Quett Masire”.
3Witman (1977), Calvert (1985), and Alesina (1988) provide examples of models where politicians are motivated
by the desire to inﬂuence policy. The question of whether intrinsic motivations aﬀect political behavior has received
a lot of recent attention. For instance Besley and Ghatak (2005) develop a model where incentives depend on the
extent to which agents agree with the cause. Callander (2007) use a game-theoretical model of electoral competition
to distinguish between oﬃce-motivated politicians versus policy-motivated politicians. Besley (2006) and Persson
and Tabellini (2000) provide excellent discussions of these various models of political motivations.
1ting where monitoring and accountability may be weak. For instance, using a citizen-candidate
model, Caselli and Morelli (2004) show that the competence of the elected body is increasing in the
political rewards from oﬃce. An opposite prediction emerges from the Matozzi and Merlo (2007)
where an increase in the salary a politician receives while in oﬃce decreases the average quality of
individuals who become politicians. Thus, the question is ultimately an empirical one.
In this paper, we use exogenous variation in the salaries of local politicians across Brazil’s
municipal governments to study the eﬀects of wages on political selection and performance. In
particular, we examine whether salaries aﬀect who enters politics, the quality of elected politicians,
and their legislative performance. We overcome two existing obstacles to identify these eﬀects.
First, previous studies have had to limit their analysis to elected politicians, which is a selected
group with unobserved skills (e.g. ability, valence) that may not only aﬀect their probability
of winning but also their performance while in oﬃce.4 We gather data on all candidates that
ran for oﬃce, and thus we are able estimate the eﬀects of wages on the number of candidates
and their characteristics. Second, and more importantly, wages are not set randomly, but often
by the politicians themselves, which introduces several identiﬁcation concerns. Politicians that
perform better may be able to demand higher wages (Di Tella and Fisman 2004). We address
this identiﬁcation issue by exploiting a quasi-experimental source of variation in local legislators’
salaries. A 2000 constitutional amendment introduced a cap on the maximum salary that could be
paid to local legislators. This cap, which varies according to the municipality’s population, induces
discontinuities in wages across municipalities. We use these discontinuities to estimate the causal
eﬀects of salaries on political selection and performance using a two-stage least squares estimator
motivated by the fuzzy regression-discontinuity design (Campbell 1969; Van Der Klaauw 2002).
Our ﬁndings indicate that increases in the salary of legislators not only attract more individuals
to run for political oﬃce, but also attracts more educated ones. A 10 percent increase in wages
increases political competition by 0.13 candidates per seat and the share of candidates with a high
school degree by 1.5 percent. Moreover, these eﬀects are not limited to the pool of candidates.
Higher salaries also aﬀect the composition of politicians that get elected. Among municipalities
4Existing studies do not have information on political candidates, only on those elected for oﬃce. See for example
Besley (2004) and Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005).
2that oﬀer higher salaries, the legislative body is more educated and has more political experience.
A 10 percent increase in wage increases the share of legislators with more than 3 terms of experience
by 0.12 percentage points
In addition to these eﬀects on political selection, we also ﬁnd that salaries aﬀect political
performance. Legislators can inﬂuence local policy-making by submitting bills (formal requests for
project that are then passed into law) and petitions (requests for targeted public works). We ﬁnd
that higher wages increase both the number of bills submitted by the legislators and those approved,
as well as, the likelihood of existing legislative commissions – a measure internal organization of
the legislature. Moreover, higher salaries also increase the number of health clinics, the number of
schools and improve school infrastructure.
While these eﬀects on legislative performance are consistent with a political agency model,
where changes in the value of holding oﬃce aﬀects political behavior, it is diﬃcult to separate out
this eﬀect from a selection eﬀect. We do however provide suggestive evidence that the increase in
legislative productivity is not entirely driven by the positive selection of politicians. Instead, our
results indicate that legislators do put eﬀort in policy-making due to an increase in the future value
of holding oﬃce.
This paper presents the ﬁrst empirical evidence that exploits exogenous variation in politicians’
wage to identify its eﬀects on political selection and performance. Existing studies have simulated
the eﬀects of politician wages using structural models. Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005) esti-
mate a dynamic model of career decisions of U.S. congressmen to quantify the returns to a career in
congress. The paper shows that a 20 percent increase in the wages of House members increases the
likelihood of running for re-election from 91.2 percent to 94.2 percent. Using the same framework,
Keane and Merlo (2007) examines the eﬀects of a 20 percent reduction in salaries. This policy sim-
ulation leads to not only a 14 percent reduction in the average duration of congressional careers,
but also induces skilled politicians to exit disproportionately more. These ﬁndings are consistent
with our results that higher wages decrease turnover and increase the education level of the leg-
islature. Our paper complements these empirical studies in several ways. It examines the eﬀects
of wages, not only political selection, but also on candidate entry. With data only on members
3of Congress, these previous studies cannot evaluate the eﬀects of wages on the composition of the
pool of potential candidates. Moreover, our study also focuses on legislative productivity and the
provision of public goods.
Our results lend further empirical support for the citizen-candidate models of Besley and Coate
(1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (2004), which highlight the importance of politicians’ identity
for policy choices.5 Our results are thus consistent with Besley, Pande, and Rao (2005), who use
data from Indian villages and show that education increases the chances of selection to public
oﬃce and reduces politicians’ opportunism. Our paper is also related to a large body of work in
political agency models that focus on the role of electoral accountability in disciplining incumbent
politicians.6 Our ﬁndings suggest that increases in wages are likely to make incumbent politicians
more accountable because it makes the value of holding oﬃce in the future higher. Politicians
respond by increasing their legislative eﬀort in order to boost their chances of re-election.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework that
will help in interpreting our empirical ﬁndings. Section 3 provides the institutional background and
describes the data used for the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, followed by the
results shown in section 5 and the conclusions in section 6.
2 Theoretical Framework
The citizen-candidate models of Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (2004) provide
a natural framework to examine how politicians’ remuneration aﬀects the decision of citizens to
become political candidates. Several recent studies have built upon this framework to analyze the
eﬀects of monetary incentives on the average quality of politicians, and as we discuss in this section,
the theoretical predictions tend to be ambiguous. Moreover, because the citizen-candidate model
focuses on political entry, it provides few insights on politicians’ behavior. For predictions about
the eﬀects of monetary incentives on political behavior, we discuss a political agency model that
5See Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) and Chattopadhyay and Duﬄo (2004) for other empirical evidence in support
of these models.
6See Barro (1970) and Ferejohn (1986) for original work focusing exclusively on hidden cations. More recently,
Besley (2006) and Smart and Sturm (2006) build models with both unobserved types and actions. Empirical evidence
is provided by Besley and Case (1995) and Ferraz and Finan (2007).
4incorporates uncertainty about the politician’s type as well as his actions. In this model, politicians
are more likely to behave in accordance with the voters’ preferences as the beneﬁts of oﬃce increase.
2.1 Citizens’ Quality and Political Selection
The basic theoretical framework used to study the decision to enter politics is the citizen-candidate
model [Besley and Coate (1997); Osborne and Slivinski (2004)]. In this class of models, citizens’
decide whether or not to run for public oﬃce in an environment where running for oﬃce is costly and
candidates cannot fully commit to policy implementation. Without full commitment, candidate
heterogeneity in preferences ultimately determines the policy that is then implemented. Recent
models have adopted this framework to understand how diﬀerences in the quality of citizens, as
opposed to preferences, might aﬀect policy choices.7
Caselli and Morelli (2004) present a model where individuals diﬀer with respect to their quality
as politicians.8 The population is composed of high and low ability individuals. High ability
individuals have better policymaking skills and are also more productive in the private sector.
Voters, however, do not observe the quality of the candidates, but do receive a signal from each
candidate that has a probability larger than 0.5 of being correct. Candidates cannot control the
signal they emit, but know their signal before deciding to run for oﬃce. In equilibrium, voters will
only select high-signal candidates. Low-ability citizens who happen to emit a high signal will require
a lower remuneration to run for oﬃce because their outside options are lower. As the monetary
returns from oﬃce decrease, high quality individuals are less likely to run and the proportion of
low quality-high signal candidates increases. Thus this model predicts that the competence of the
elected body is increasing in the political rewards from oﬃce.
In a related paper, Messner and Polborn (2004) also use a citizen-candidate framework to
analyze the eﬀect of remuneration on political entry. Their model generates, however, a diﬀerent
comparative static result. The expected quality of candidates may decrease as the beneﬁts of
7In their original, Besley and Coate (1997) present an example where candidates diﬀer with respect to policy-
making abilities. Their focus, however, is on the Pareto Optimality of the political equilibrium rather than the
resulting quality of government.
8The term quality is used in most of these models as the ability to provide public goods at low costs. Caselli and
Morelli (2004) emphasize that quality is mostly determined by two factors: competence and honesty.
5holding oﬃce increase. With higher wages, more individuals enter politics thus increasing the
incentive for more-competent candidates to free-ride on the other candidates and thus not run for
oﬃce.
A similar result is obtained by Matozzi and Merlo (2007) using a dynamic equilibrium overlap-
ping generations model. In their model politicians are heterogeneous with respect to market ability
and political skills. They assume that while individuals can detect their political skills early in life,
discovering market ability entails some experimentation (this assumption allows them to focus on
a signaling game with only one dimension). In the ﬁrst period of life, individuals decide whether
to become politicians or enter the private sector. If they become politicians, their political skill
becomes public information. In the second period, politicians decide whether to remain in politics,
or move to the private sector. The market ability is then revealed with a positive probability (less
than one). In their model, an increase in the salary of politicians induces two eﬀects: an entry eﬀect,
which aﬀects the average quality of persons that become politicians, and a retention eﬀect given
by the turnover in the political sector. An increase in the return to the political profession makes
it more attractive compared to private sector activities. Hence lower quality individuals enter the
political sector lowering the average quality of entering politicians. In addition, it also increases
the second-period earnings relative to the market wage making it more desirable for politicians to
stay in oﬃce for a second-term instead of moving to the private sector.
While these papers provide interesting insights into the eﬀects of wages on political selection,
they do not provide any predictions on how wages will aﬀect the behavior of politicians once in
oﬃce. Since the basic citizen-candidate model is static, post-election actions are not modeled.
Nonetheless, changes in politician remuneration aﬀect the value of holding oﬃce in the future and,
if politicians can get reelected, it is likely to aﬀect their behavior. Political agency models provide
a useful framework to understand these additional eﬀects.
62.2 Honesty, Quality, and Political Behavior
Besley (2004) examines the eﬀects of wages on the selection and behavior of politicians using a po-
litical agency model where voters are unable to observe either the politician’s type or his actions.9
In the model, there are two-types of politicians: congruent and dissonant politicians. Congruent
politicians always act in accordance with voters’ objectives, whereas dissonant politicians receive
additional rents from taking an action that is diﬀerent from voter’s preferred action. But, as Besley
(2004) shows, given the possibility of re-election, as the value of holding oﬃce increases, dissonant
politicians are much more likely to refrain from rent-seeking and behave according to voters’ pref-
erences. Hence, this model predicts that an increase in remuneration increases average politician’s
performance (as dissonant politician take voters’ preferred action) and, thus also decreases turnover
of incumbent politicians.
Besley (2004) also generates predictions about the eﬀects of monetary incentives on political
selection. Given that congruent politicians always take the voters’ preferred action and will get
re-elected for doing so, they will run for oﬃce as long as the salary is at least as high as their outside
option (the private sector wage). For dissonant politicians, the value of entering politics includes
both the remuneration and the expected gains from taking the dissonant action. Among dissonant
politicians, those with higher salaries in the private sector are less likely to take the congruent
action. This is because the value of holding oﬃce in the future (if reelected) is lower. The model
predicts that as the wages of politicians increase, the quality of politicians in the pool improves
and the fraction of elected congruent politicians also increases.
One of the main diﬀerences between the Besley (2004) model and those cited above lies in the
source of heterogeneity among candidates. While the citizen-candidate models focus on diﬀerences
in competency (good versus bad politicians), Besley (2004) emphasizes congruency which is more
related to the honesty dimension of candidate quality. When the model is extended to incorporate
competency, the average level of competency in the population is not necessarily increasing in wages.
Instead, there are two competing eﬀects as remuneration increases: the quality of participants from
each group increases (more competent congruent and dissonant politicians enter the pool), and
9See Banks and Sundaram (1993) for an early agency model with both adverse selection and moral hazard.
7entry by relatively less competent politicians in the congruent group. The net eﬀect of wages on
the average quality of politicians depends on which eﬀect dominates.
To summarize, the models discussed above provide four main hypotheses. An increase in the
salary of politicians will:
1. Increase or decrease the quality in the pool of candidates.
2. Increase or decrease the quality of elected politicians.
3. Decrease turnover of incumbent politicians.
4. Increase the eﬀort put forth by incumbent politicians.
These are the predictions we take to the data using the variation in the wages and characteristics
of candidates and elected politicians in Brazil’s local legislatures.
3 Institutional Background and Data
3.1 Local Governments and the Cˆ amara de Vereadores
Brazil is one of the most decentralized countries in the world. Local governments receive large
sums of resources to provide a signiﬁcant share of public services.10 The decision on how to
spend these resources is made by an elected mayor in conjunction with the local legislature – the
Cˆ amara de Vereadores.11 These cˆ amaras consist of a council of legislators elected from an open list,
proportional representation system every four years. Its size varies from 9-55 members depending
on the municipality’s population. According to Brazil’s constitution, the legislature is responsible
for enacting laws and monitoring the executive for its use of public resources. Speciﬁcally, legislators
are in charge of proposing bills consisting of programs and budgetary projects that would become
laws, creating commissions designed to discuss local problems, and encouraging public hearings to
learn about the needs of the community.
10Diﬀerently from local governments in other countries, Brazil’s municipalities are responsible for providing edu-
cation, health care, transportation, and local infrastructure. The 5,560 Brazilian municipalities receive on average
$35 billion per year from the federal government, which represents approximately 15 percent of federal government’s
revenue.
11Brazil’s Cˆ amaras de Vereadores, date back to the 1800s. They were established by the Portuguese crown in the
major Vilas and were in charge of all local decision-making including administrative, police, and judiciary acts. See
Leal (1975) for details on its historical evolution.
8Legislators can inﬂuence local spending and the quality of public policy in three ways. First,
legislators must approve the municipal budget. The legislature receives a detailed budget proposal
from the mayor with spending items on all programs and public work projects. The legislature
(or a speciﬁc ﬁnance commission) analyzes the budget proposal and then returns it to the mayor
with or without line-items vetoes.12 Despite the fact the legislators must approve the budget and
can introduce line items, local mayors are not obligated to spend on any approved items and have
signiﬁcant discretion over local spending. The budget, as approved by legislators, does impose
however a limit on the amounts that can be spent by the mayor for speciﬁc items.13
In eﬀect, local legislators inﬂuence local policy-making mainly by submitting bills (projetos de
lei) and petitions (indica¸ c˜ oes). Bills consist of formal projects that are submitted for considera-
tion to the legislature in order to become municipal laws. They can be submitted by individual
legislators, a legislative committee, or the mayor himself. While most bills submitted by mayors
focus on obtaining funds for extra spending and the hiring of public employees, bills formulated by
legislators focus on the adoption of new programs or the creation of local councils to monitor the
executive for its implementation of social programs. Some examples will help to illustrate the use
of these bills. In the municipality of Brumado, in Bahia, the legislator Gilberto Dias Lima, elected
in 2004, proposed two bills that directly aﬀect the quality of education and health provided. The
ﬁrst project established direct elections for municipal school directors and a second project obliges
municipal health clinics to test newborns for hearing diﬃculties. Bills are also used to establish new
social programs. Rosinere Fran¸ ca Abbud, a legislator from Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, presented
a bill aimed at creating an emergency unemployment program. In Santa Cruz do Capibaribe,
Pernambuco, legislator Rui Jos´ e Medeiros Silva proposed a bill to create a municipal council of
economic and social development.
Petitions, on the other hand, consist of explicit requests made individually by legislators to the
mayor, for geographically targeted public works and services. Most petitions consist of infrastruc-
12See Pereira and Mueller (2002) for an analysis of the budget process and the executive-legislative relations in
Brazil.
13Diﬀerently from the federal congress, however, amendments play a small role in the bargaining process between
the local executive and legislative (Melo 2005). See Ames (1995) for a detailed description on the use of Emendas
Parlamentares in Brazil.
9ture projects such as road building, construction of health clinics and schools. But it is also common
to see legislators request such items as additional doctors in local clinics or teachers and computers
for schools. For instance, in the municipality of S˜ ao Manuel, S˜ ao Paulo, a legislator sent a petition
to the mayor to build a primary school in the neighborhood of Conquista e Bela Vista. In Itabela,
Bahia, the legislator Genilda Farias requested resources to train primary school teachers, while
another legislator, Agnaldo Santos, proposed the hiring of doctors to attend the growing number of
patients in the Itabela health center. In the municipality of Taquari, Rio Grande do Sul, petition
no.140/06, from legislator Celso G¨ oethel, asked for the acquisition of computers for the municipal
school “S´ oror Joana Ang´ elica”, located in Passo do Juncal. In addition to submitting bills and
public work requests, local legislators are also in charge of monitoring the executive for its use of
public resources. The quality of legislators (competence and honesty) is likely to aﬀect whether
they overlook corruption, irregular public hires, and irregularities in the public administration.14
Diﬀerently from mayors who face a two term-limit, legislators can get reelected indeﬁnitely.
Hence, politicians that desire a career in local politics have strong incentives to perform according
to voters expectations. Moreover, for some politicians, the local legislature is just a ﬁrst step
towards a higher level political position. A large number of mayors, governors and congressmen
started their careers as local legislators. For all these reasons, increases in legislators salaries are
likely to induce vereadores to put more eﬀort into signaling high productivity to voters in order to
get reelected or build a future career.
We measure this eﬀort by examining the number of bills submitted and approved by legislators
and the variation in public services using data for the number of schools, health clinics, teachers
and doctors. In order to illustrate how legislators inform voters about the bills and petitions
(indica¸ c˜ oes) they have submitted, we present in Appendix B three examples extracted from the
personal web sites of legislators. Each example includes the name of the legislator, the municipality
they got elected for, and the internet address of the web site that provides information on their
accomplishments.
In the ﬁrst example, legislator Ana Selma, from Cabo de Santo Agostinho, Pernambuco, de-
14See Lopez (2004) for a detailed case study of the executive-legislative relation at the municipal level.
10scribes her visit to the city of Garapu, where she informed its citizens about her petitions to beneﬁt
the region. She requested the construction of a primary school, a health clinic for the Health
Family Program and the intensiﬁcation of police escorts to control crime. In the second example,
legislator Rom´ erio, from Resende in the state of Rio de Janeiro, highlights his petitions for educa-
tional improvements. His website claims the acquisition of magazines and newspapers for school
libraries, and the construction of computer and science labs in the local schools. The third example
illustrated by Jos´ e Damaso, from Palmas, informs his constituents about his requests for the con-
struction of new classrooms in the municipal school of Tiago Barbosa, as well as the construction
of a local police station in the community of Taquari.15
3.2 Constitutional Rules and the Salary of Legislators
The salary of federal deputies, as determined by Brazil’s constitution, serves as the basis for the
wages of all other legislators. State legislators are free to set their own salary subject to a maximum
of 75 percent of what federal deputies earn and until 2000 local legislators were subject to a
maximum salary of 75 percent of state deputies’ earnings. This restriction, although aimed at
limiting spending in local legislatures, was not enough to control the rent-seeking behavior of local
legislators. Legislative spending exploded during the nineties and at the end of 2000 a constitutional
amendment was established to further limit the maximum salary of local legislators. It deﬁned caps
on the salary of legislators and the share of revenues that could be spent on the local legislature as
a function of municipal population.
Table 1 summarizes the main features of this law. There are 6 population thresholds deﬁning the
maximum salary of legislators. In smaller municipalities, up to 10,000 inhabitants, local legislators
can get as much as 20 percent of the state deputy salary. This share increases to 30 percent in
municipalities with a population between 10,000 and 50,000 residents. For larger municipalities,
those above 500,000 inhabitants, the maximum value is set at 75 percent of state deputy salaries.
Column 3 displays the maximum allowed wages estimated for 2004/2005, given that federal deputies
15These three examples are just a sample of many webpages and blogs used to disseminate the information about
the actions being taken by legislators. In eﬀect, several legislators list the bills and petitions submitted on their web
pages or blogs as a way to signal productivity to voters.
11had a salary of R$12,847.2 and state deputies had a salary capped at R$9,635.4.16 For municipalities
with less than 10,000 inhabitants, the maximum salary of a legislature can receive is R$1,927
per month versus R$7,227 per month for legislators residing in municipalities with a population
above 500,000 inhabitants. The constitutional amendment also capped the amount of legislative
spending as a percent of total revenues, but these percentages only vary for the municipalities with
a population above 100,000, which represents only 3 percent of the sample (see column 4).
Although some municipalities do set their salaries at the upper limit, this is generally not the
case. Figure 1 shows a histogram with the frequency of municipalities in each wage group. The
vertical lines indicate the maximum salary that could be paid. Two things are clear from the
ﬁgure. First, although there is some bunching at the maximum salary, there is also a large number
of municipalities that set salaries below that maximum permitted by law. Second, the largest share
of municipalities belongs to the ﬁrst two cutoﬀs (population less than 50,000).
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main data source used in this study comes from a new Census of Brazil’s Municipal Legisla-
tures. It was collected in 2005 by the Interlegis, a sub-secretary of the Brazilian Senate, for 5,414
municipalities. Approximately 260 surveyors collected data on physical facilities (e.g. building
ownership, existence of telephone lines, and access to the internet); institutional characteristics
(e.g. administrative structure, existence of legislative commissions, wage paid to legislators); and
personal characteristics of legislators (e.g. education, gender, age, term in oﬃce). A novel feature
of this census is the availability of municipal level data on the legislators’ wages, and measures of
legislative output (number of bills submitted and approved).17
To study the eﬀects of wages on political entry and selection, we construct a complementary
dataset with the characteristics of legislative candidates that ran in the 2004 election. Using the
electronic ﬁles available from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), we calculate for each munic-
16There is almost no variation in the salaries of state deputies across Brazil. Most of the variation comes from the
perks from oﬃce.
17We also have data on total compensation (wages plus perks from oﬃce such as gas for their cars and mobile
phones) but there is considerable measurement error associated with these ﬁgures. We use wages in the analysis that
follows but our results are similar if instead we use total compensation.
12ipality, the number of candidates, the proportion of female candidates, their age, the distribution
of candidates by schooling levels, and their political parties.
For the purpose of the analysis, it is important to account for any diﬀerences in municipal
characteristics and to test whether these characteristics are discontinuous at the wage cutoﬀs. As
such, we gathered information from several additional sources.18 The Brazilian Institute of Geogra-
phy and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geograﬁa e Estat´ ıstica(IBGE)) 2000 population census
provides us with socio-economic characteristics such as the percentage of urban population, Gini
coeﬃcient, income per capita and a measure of infrastructure availability (percentage of households
with electricity). In addition, we use the IBGE inter-census population estimates to obtain data on
the 2003 municipal population. To control for diﬀerent institutional features of the municipality, we
use the 2002 and 2005 Perﬁl dos Munic´ ıpios Brasileiros: Gest˜ ao P´ ublica. This survey characterizes
various aspects of the public administration, such as budgetary and planning procedures, the num-
ber of public employees. It also provides us with structural features such as the existence of local
radio and the presence of a judge and public prosecutors. Public ﬁnance data was obtained from
the National Treasury (Secretaria do Tesouro) through the FINBRA dataset. It contains municipal
spending by categories and revenues by sources (i.e. local taxes, intergovernmental transfers). The
diﬀerences in legislators’ wages across municipalities might, in part, reﬂect diﬀerences in living costs
across regions. In order to control for this we also gathered data on average municipal wages from
the RAIS, which includes information on all workers in the public sector and formal private sector.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 2. The
average size of the legislature is about 9 legislators (which is equal to the minimum size) and the
average wage for a legislator is R$1740, which is approximately 2.6 times the average wage for
workers. In a large number of municipalities, the legislature is in session for only part of the week,
on average 10 hours. During 2005, there were approximately 0.91 bills submitted per legislator
and 0.73 got approved. The legislatures are mainly composed of male legislators (approximately 87
percent) and legislators that are either in their ﬁrst or second mandate (72 percent). Approximately
one third are less than 40 years old and the average years of schooling of legislators is 9.7 (median
18See the data appendix A for a detailed description of data sources.
13is 10.6), which is equivalent to a high school drop-out. Elected legislators seem to be slightly more
educated than the average candidate (9.08 years of schooling) and a smaller proportion of woman
get elected (women are, on average, 21 percent of candidates). There are, on average, 6.2 candidates
per seat, but this number drops to 3.4 for the ﬁrst quartile of municipalities.
As for municipalities in Brazil, they are, on average, small (26,500 inhabitants), largely urban
(61% or urban population), highly unequal (average Gini coeﬃcient of 0.56), and approximately a
quarter of the population is illiterate.
4 Empirical Strategy
Our analysis estimates the eﬀects of wages on politician selection and performance. To identify
these eﬀects, we exploit discontinuities in the wages that local legislators receive due to particular
population restrictions. In this section, we discuss the econometric models used to estimate these
wage eﬀects and the assumptions needed for a causal interpretation of the parameters of interest.
Consider the following cross-sectional relationship between wages and politician performance:
yi = β0 + β1 log(w)i + x0
iδ + εi (1)
log(w)i = α + x0
iθ + νi
where yi measures of the average performance of politicians in municipality i (e.g. the average
number of projects approved by the legislative council), wi is the wage that members of the local
legislature receive, xi is a vector of observed municipal characteristics, and εi and νi are unob-
served determinants of politician performance and wages, respectively. Under the assumption that
E[εiνi] = 0, the least squares estimator of β1 will be a consistent estimate of the causal eﬀect of
wages on politician performance.
Unfortunately, there are several potential omitted factors that covary with both wages and
politician performance. For instance, municipalities that oﬀer higher wages presumably attract
more able politicians who are also more productive in submitting bills in the legislature. Other
potential omitted factors may also arise from the demand-side. Municipalities with higher levels of
14economic or political activity may not only oﬀer higher wages but also demand more action from
their public ﬁgures (see Di Tella and Fisman (2004)).
To overcome these identiﬁcation concerns, we use an instrumental variables approach that ex-
ploits the discontinuities in politician wages created by federally-mandated population cutoﬀs.19
Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity framework (Van Der Klaauw 2002), we use the cutoﬀ indi-
cators as excluded instruments and rewrite equation (1) as follows:
yi = β0 + β1E[log(w)i|Pi, xi] + f(Pi) + x0
iδ + εi (2)
E[log(w)i|Pi, xi] = α0 +
5 X
k=1
αk1{Pi > ¯ Pk} + g(Pi) + x0
iθ
where Pi is the population of municipality i, 1{·} is an indicator function that equals one if the
municipality’s population is above the kth cutoﬀ ¯ Pk. The functions f(·) and g(·) are ﬂexible
functions of population.
In the context of equation (2), consistent estimation of β1 relies on the assumptions that, at the
population cutoﬀs, wages are discontinuous (which is testable), and that f(·) and g(·) are locally
continuous (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001). If f(·) and g(·) are speciﬁed correctly, then
using the cutoﬀs indicators as the excluded instruments will provide a consistent estimate of β1. In
our preferred speciﬁcation, we use ﬁve population cut-oﬀs and estimate f(·) and g(·) as piecewise
linear splines (i.e. separate regressions on both sides of each discontinuity). We also show that our
results are robust to relaxing this functional form assumption.20
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we provide evidence that politicians’ salaries aﬀect both the the composition of
politicians that run for and get elected into oﬃce, as well as their behavior. These results are
robust to various speciﬁcations and are consistent with the models of Caselli and Morelli (2004)
19Angrist and Lavy (1999) uses a similar strategy to study the eﬀects of class size on test scores.
20Alternatively, the fuzzy-regression discontinuity estimator could be implemented using a non-parametric ap-
proach. A local linear regression could be used to estimate the outcome and treatment regressions. See Imbens and
Lemieux (2008) for an overview of diﬀerent alternatives for estimating the Regression Discontinuity.
15and Besley (2004).
5.1 The Eﬀects of Wages on Candidate Entry and Characteristics
OLS Estimates
We begin our analysis by documenting the relationship between the characteristics of politicians
that ran for the local legislative oﬃce in the 2004 elections and legislators’ wages. Column 1 of
Table 3 reports the estimated slope coeﬃcient from an OLS regression where the dependent variable
is the number of candidates per seat. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, which adjusts for the population
of the municipality, the number of assistants per legislator, and the number of hours for which the
legislature functions per week, we ﬁnd a strong positive association suggesting that a 10 percent
increase in wages is associated with a 0.3 increase in the number of candidates. In column 2, we
present our full speciﬁcation that, in addition to the controls presented in column 1, adjusts for
other characteristics of the municipality such as income and urbanization, but also includes average
wage which captures diﬀerences in a politician’s opportunity costs across municipalities. Under our
full speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on log wages deceases by 0.3, but it remains highly statistically
signiﬁcant. Higher wages may not only attract more political competition, but also a diﬀerent
composition of candidates. In columns 3 and 4, we re-estimate the speciﬁcations reported in the
ﬁrst two columns but use as the dependent variable, the candidate’s years of schooling. We ﬁnd that
higher wages are associated with candidates with more years of education (point estimate 0.719;
robust standard error = 0.043). Much of this eﬀect appears to come from the fact that among
municipalities that oﬀer higher wages, the share of candidates with at least a high school degree is
higher (see columns 7 and 8).21 Interestingly, however, the average wages in the municipality which
would proxy for the candidate’s opportunity cost, is not a strong predictor of quality. In addition
to education levels, wages are associated with a higher share of female candidates (see columns 9
and 10) and older candidates (see columns 11 and 12); although in the former, the point estimates
are quite small in magnitude.
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 suggest that higher remuneration is associated with
21In some speciﬁcations, we also ﬁnd that the literacy rate of the population is a strong predictor of the candidates’
education levels.
16increased competition and more educated candidates. One should, however, be cautious to interpret
these results as causal, as there are several omitted factors that could be confounding these results.
We address these identiﬁcation concerns in the next section.
Population Thresholds and Politicians’ Salaries
As we discussed in Section 3, the federal government stipulated a ceiling for the wage of local
politicians that depends on various population thresholds. The innovation of our empirical approach
is to use this exogenous variation in wage determination to identify the eﬀects of wages on politician
selection and performance. The eﬀects of the federal mandate on politicians’ wages can be seen in
the 3 panels presented in Figure 3, which plots politician wages in 2005 against the municipality’s
population in 2003.22 Each panel presents unadjusted population-cell means of wages (depicted by
the small circles) along with the ﬁtted values of a locally weighted regression calculated within each
population segment (as denoted by the vertical lines).23 With perhaps the exception of the ﬁrst
cutoﬀ, the data exhibit a discernable step function at each segment. For instance, municipalities
between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (i.e. the third segment) display a cluster of wages set at
around R$ 4,000 per month (approximately $2,200). In the fourth segment, the wages appear to
cluster at just below R$5,000. The ﬁgure also highlights the fact that several municipalities do not
set their politician wages to the maximum allowance (perhaps due to budget constraints).
The general patterns presented in the ﬁgure are also borne out in the adjusted regression results.
In Table 4, column 1 presents the ﬁrst-stage regression of log wages on indicators for whether
population is above the ﬁrst ﬁve cutoﬀs along with a piecewise linear spline for population. The
coeﬃcients on the cutoﬀ indicators estimate the average increase in log wages at each threshold
point. For instance, the indicator for the ﬁrst cutoﬀ suggests that wages in municipalities just
above the population threshold pay politicians 21 percent more than municipalities immediately
below the cutoﬀs. The other cutoﬀs display a similar pattern to the one presented in Figure 3,
22We use the 2003 population because the wages in 2005, the ﬁrst year of the legislature, had to be set by the
previous legislature in power between 2001 and 2004. Since wage changes are usually done during the last year of
the legislature and population estimates are only available in the end of the year, legislators choosing wages in 2004
were likely to be regulated based on the 2003 population.
23The average wage is computed for a 200 person bin.
17except for the second cutoﬀ where the discontinuity is close to zero and not statistically signiﬁcant.
The results remain very similar when we control for municipal characteristics in column 2.
Interestingly, when we only allow for diﬀerential slopes in the ﬁrst two cut-oﬀs (which are the
ones that are signiﬁcant in the second speciﬁcation) the regression does not lose any explanatory
power and the cutoﬀ indicators have more predictive power.24 Overall, the regressions ﬁt the data
fairly well as the cut-oﬀ indicators and the population function explain almost 70 percent of the
variation in wages generating a joint F-statistic of 29.10 on the excluded instruments.
Instrumental Variable Estimates of Candidate Characteristics
Table 5 presents the IV estimates for the eﬀects of wages on the characteristics of politicians that
were reported in Table 3. For each dependent variable, we estimate equation (2) which in addition
to the controls presented in Table 3, also adjusts for a piecewise linear spline in population. The
excluded instruments are the indicator variables for the ﬁve cutoﬀ points, and the joint test of their
signiﬁcance is reported for each sample.
In column 1, we present the IV results for the eﬀect of wages on the number of candidates per
seat that ran for election in 2004. The estimated coeﬃcient on wages is 1.463 (robust standard
error = 0.598) which is approximately half the size of the OLS estimate (see Table 3), and suggests
that a 10 percent increase in wages increase political competition by 0.15 candidates per seat. In
column 2, we report our full speciﬁcation and ﬁnd that the point estimate is virtually unchanged
with additional controls.
In columns 3-12 we report the eﬀects of wages on the characteristics of candidates. The results
are consistent with the OLS estimates. For instance, the pool of candidates tend be more educated:
one more unit of log wages are associated with 0.63 more years of school (robust standard error =
0.318). Again, the eﬀects on education are mostly due to an increase in the share of candidates with
at least a high school education. A 10 percent increase in wages increases the share of candidates
with at least a high school degree by 1.5 percent. We also ﬁnd evidence that higher wages attract
more females and younger candidates (contrary to the OLS estimates), but the estimated eﬀects are
24For all of our subsequent results, we use the second speciﬁcation presented in Table 4 as the ﬁrst stage. Using
the third speciﬁcation provides similar results that given the higher F-statistic are more precise.
18rather minimal. In general, the estimated coeﬃcients in the IV speciﬁcations are smaller than the
OLS estimates suggesting that the presence of unobserved characteristics over-estimate the eﬀects
of salaries on candidate characteristics.
5.2 The Eﬀects of Wages on the Selection of Candidates
Thus far, we have shown that the wages politicians receive aﬀect the pool of legislator candidates.
But, this does not necessarily imply a change in the composition of elected politicians. Table 6
presents the eﬀects of wages on various characteristics of the 2004 elected legislative body. Panel A
reports the IV coeﬃcients from estimating model (2), whereas Panel B presents the OLS estimates
for comparison. As with previous tables, the odd columns presents our basic speciﬁcation and the
even columns add municipal characteristics.
In columns 1 and 2, we see that higher wages increase legislators’ tenure. The estimated eﬀect
of log wages on average number of terms is 0.395 (see column 1 of panel A) and highly signiﬁcant
(robust standard error = 0.150). Consistent with this eﬀect, higher wages increase the share
of legislator with 3-7 terms of tenure by approximately 0.12 percentage points (robust standard
error=0.04), while decreasing the share of legislators with no more than 2 terms of experience by
-0.074 percentage points (robust standard error = 0.056). These results support the theoretical
prediction that higher wages decrease turnover rates of politicians and echo the empirical ﬁndings
of Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005).25
As with the pool of candidates, the results also indicate that wages aﬀect the average education
level of the legislative body. The estimates reported in columns 7 and 8 suggest that a 10 percent
increase in wages will increase the average education the legislature by 0.10 years, although the
estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. We do however ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects on the share of
legislatures with at least a high school degree. A 10 percent increase in wages is associated with a
4 percent increase in the share of legislators with at least a high school degree (see column 12 of
Panel A). Columns 13-14 and 15-16 report the eﬀects of wages on the share of female legislators and
the average age respectively. Although the point estimates are positive in both of these categories,
25Admittedly, our measure of tenure does not exactly capture turnover rates. To measure turnover precisely, we
would need individual data matched across the two electoral terms, which we are currently working on.
19they are relatively small in magnitude and measured imprecisely.
In sum, exploiting discontinuities in the wages that local legislators receive, the ﬁndings indicate
that higher wages not only attract a better pool of potential candidates (more educated) but also
aﬀect the composition of elected legislators. Given the positive selection, a natural question to
ask is whether or not wages also aﬀect politicians’ behavior and performance. As we discussed in
the theoretical framework, there are many theoretical reasons why legislative performance might
be aﬀected. First, as the monetary beneﬁts from holding oﬃce increase, elected oﬃcials will exert
more eﬀort in order to signal productivity to voters and get re-elected. Second, as we change the
composition and type of legislators that are elected, we would expect performance and eﬀort to
change. Next, we investigate whether higher salaries aﬀect legislative performance using indicators
of bills submitted and approved, and measures of the provision of local public goods.
5.3 The Eﬀects of Wages on Politician Performance
Although there are several potential indicators of politician performance, it is not easy to obtain
an objective measure for local legislatures. We use the data available in the legislative census to
measure performance as the number of bills submitted and the number of bills approved by the
legislators in 2005. Although these measures do not account for the quality of the bills and projects
submitted, we would expect the number of bills to be a function of legislators’ eﬀort.26
Table 7 presents estimates for the eﬀects of wages on the various measures of legislative per-
formance. The IV results are displayed in panel A while the OLS results are shown in panel B for
comparison. For each dependent variable, we estimate equation (2) with municipal controls and a
piecewise linear spline in population (not shown in results). The excluded instruments are again
the indicator variables for the ﬁve cutoﬀ points.
Column 1 of Panel A reports the estimated slope coeﬃcient from an IV regression where the
dependent variable is the log of the number of bills submitted per legislator.27 In the ﬁrst speciﬁca-
tion, which adjusts for the population of the municipality, the number of assistants per legislator,
26See for example Clinton and Lapinski (2006) for a discussion on measuring legislative accomplishment.
27Before taking the log, we add a one to the total number of bills submitted to avoid losing the municipalities that
had zero bill in 2005. To do so, does not aﬀect our results in the slightest.
20and the number of hours the legislature is in session, we ﬁnd a strong positive association suggesting
that a 10 percent increase in wages increases the number of bills submitted by 5 percent. The esti-
mated eﬀect is approximately 0.07 percentage points lower than the OLS estimate. In column 2, we
report our full speciﬁcation and ﬁnd that the point estimate is virtually unchanged with additional
controls. Even though the number of bills submitted does capture a measure of politician’s eﬀort,
perhaps more important for society is whether these bills get approved. In columns 3 and 4, we
re-estimate the speciﬁcations reported in the ﬁrst two columns but use the log number of approved
bills per legislator. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive relationship between wages and the number
bills approved, with an elasticity of 0.51 (robust standard error = 0.264). Moreover, when we divide
the number of bills approved by the bills submitted and compute a share of bills approved, we ﬁnd
that higher wages also increase this share (see columns 5 and 6). For instance, a 10 percent increase
in wages increases the share of bills approved by about 3 percentage points. This point estimate
lies in contrast to the OLS estimates which suggest that share actually decreases.
In addition to bills, we use another measure of the organization of the legislative process –
the functioning of the committee system. Several scholars argue that in legislatures, the existence
of committees reduce the possibility of opportunistic behavior by legislators (e.g. Weingast and
Marshall 1988 suggest that committees improve ex post enforceability). Even though most mu-
nicipalities only have one or two committees, their existence induces gains from specialization and
improvements in the quality of decision-making. In columns 7 and 8, we report the estimated
eﬀects of wages on an indicator for whether the legislature has a functioning legislative commis-
sion. We ﬁnd that legislatures with higher wages have a higher probability of having a functioning
commission, but the eﬀect is small (a 10 percent increase in wages increase the chances of having
a commission by .02 percentage points).
5.4 The Eﬀects of Wages on Public Goods
Overall, the estimates presented in Table 7 suggest that wages have an important eﬀect on legisla-
tive productivity. Local legislatures that pay their elected oﬃcials higher wages have more bills
submitted and approved and are more likely to have functioning commissions. But whether these
21legislative acts map into improvements in public goods provision is not entirely obvious, especially
given that we are unable to distinguish the type of bills in our data. Moreover, as we mention in
Section 3, legislators aﬀect policy both through formal bills as well as informal requests (petitions).
These informal requests are a common way for legislators to provide patronage to their constituents
and as depicted in Appendix B consist of various types of public works.
Unfortunately without data on petitions, we cannot test whether wages also aﬀect the number
of petitions that legislators submitted. If bills and petitions are viewed as substitutes then it is
quite possible that higher wages may have even lowered the number petitions. There are, however,
at least two reasons why this unlikely to be the case. First, we collect detailed information on
the number of petitions and bills that were submitted in 2005-2007 by legislator for a sample of
14 municipalities.28 For 148 legislators, we estimate a positive correlation coeﬃcient between the
number of petitions and bills that a legislator submitted of 0.151 (bootstrap standard error=0.083).
Second, as we will discuss in the next table, municipalities that oﬀer higher wages also provide more
of precisely the types of public goods that are presented in these petitions, e.g. schools, clinics, etc.
Table 8 presents the relationship between wages and the provision of various public goods. For
each dependent variable, we estimate equation (2) controlling for our full set of covariates. Columns
1-4 present the eﬀects of wages on various education inputs, and columns 5-7 present the eﬀects
on the supply of health inputs. With the exception of teachers with a college degree, each of these
public inputs is found in the petitions presented in Appendix B.
In order to identify the supply of new public goods resulting from the 2005 petitions, we use the
change in the stock of public of goods from 2004-2006. Column 1 reports the eﬀects of log wages on
the change from 2004-2006 in the number of primary and secondary schools. A 10 percent increase
in wages increased the number of schools by 0.22 over the two year period.29 Moreover, among
municipalities that oﬀer higher wages, there was an increase from 2004-2006 in the share of schools
with a science lab (column 2) and a computer lab (column 3). As reported in column 4, wages did
28Unfortunately this is not based on a random sample of municipalities. We could only gather this information for
a subset of the municipalities that posted this information on the legislatures’ websites.
29Although wages were only aﬀected during the 2004-2008 administration, the constitutional amendment was
announced in 2000. By comparing the change in public goods from 2004-2006, we could be underestimating these
eﬀects if legislators increased their eﬀorts in 2001-2004 in order to get re-elected.
22not aﬀect the change in the share of teachers with a college degree, but then these types of inputs
are much less aﬀected by legislators.
In columns 5-7, we also ﬁnd that higher wages aﬀect the provision of health services. For
instance, a 10 percent increase in wages increases the number of health clinics by 0.17 per 10,000
inhabitants (column 5). There is also an eﬀect on the number of doctors per capita (point estimate
= 0.642; robust standard error=0.278), and the change from 2004-2006 in the average number of
doctor visits (point estimate 0.522; robust standard error= 0.236).
5.5 Discussion
As discussed in Section 4, the principal assumption underlying our estimation results is that other
determinants of legislative performance and selection do not exhibit discontinuous jumps at the
population cutoﬀs. In this section, we demonstrate that other characteristics of the municipality
do exhibit this smoothness property and that our results are robust to controlling for ﬂexible
functional forms of the other variables. We also provide suggestive evidence that the eﬀects of
wages are not entirely driven by positive selection and that higher wages induced legislators to
exert more eﬀort.
Behavior versus Selection
Thus far the ﬁndings are consistent with the standard political agency models where higher salaries
increase the value of holding oﬃce in the future and induce more eﬀort. Unfortunately at least
two other models provide similar predictions. One possible interpretation of our results would arise
from a simple model of adverse selection. If politicians are heterogeneous in ability (or motivation)
and reservation wages were positively correlated with ability then higher wages would attract higher
quality politicians.30 This basic insight is formalized in some of the original eﬃciency wages models
(e.g. Weiss (1980)) and provides the intuition behind the predictions provided in model of Caselli
and Morelli (2004). Another potential interpretation is the possibility that higher wages increases
worker morale or dedication, as discussed by Akerlof (1982). Unfortunately, our research design
30Higher quality politicians may also induce positive social interactions that leads to more productivity.
23does not allow us to separately distinguish these various models. In this section, we do however
provide suggestive evidence that the productivity eﬀects are not entirely due to positive selection.
In Table 9, we re-estimate the eﬀects of wages on our measures of politician performance con-
trolling for the observable diﬀerences in the composition of the legislative body. Assuming that
the observed characteristics of the politicians are correlated with their unobserved characteristics,
then this approach attributes to the observed characteristics of the legislature all the eﬀects of the
unobserved variables. Thus, if politician productivity is largely due to changes in the pool of local
legislators, then we would expect that accounting for these diﬀerences should attenuate the wage
eﬀects.31
We ﬁnd that some characteristics of the legislative body have signiﬁcant power in predicting
legislative performance. More educated and male-dominated legislative bodies are associated with
higher performance.32 We do however ﬁnd that adjusting for the observable diﬀerences has only a
minimal eﬀect on the wage coeﬃcient; in most cases, attenuating the eﬀects only slightly. Thus, if
the politicians’ unobserved abilities are correlated with their measured characteristics, then selection
alone does not explain our results.
Table 10 provides further suggestive evidence that the beneﬁts of oﬃce may have induced
more eﬀort. One implication of the political agency model is that in municipalities where political
competition is lower, we might expect the eﬀects of wages to diminish. In Table 10, we report the
speciﬁcations presented in Table 9, but compare the eﬀects among municipalities in bottom quartile
of political competition to those in the top quartile of our measure of political competition.33 In
general, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of wages on the various measures of legislative productivity are much
more pronounced among municipalities where there was more political competition in the previous
elections. For instance, a 10 percent increase in wages increase the number of bills approved by
10.4 percent.
31An obvious concern with this test is that we can only capture observable diﬀerences in politician characteristics,
and controlling for these diﬀerence may not be suﬃcient to partial out all the eﬀects of the unobserved variables. For
instance, higher wages may have encouraged for instance more able politicians and if ability is no captured in the
observable diﬀerences, we are not fully accounting for the selection eﬀect.
32The negative coeﬃcient on the share of female legislators while diﬃcult to interpret is not unprecedented. Jeydel
and Taylor (2003) provides a discussion of these issues.
33Our measure of political competition is eﬀective of number of political parties that ran for mayor in the 2000
elections.
24Overall, the results suggest that salaries play a signiﬁcant role in politician performance. While
we cannot deﬁnitely rule out a selection eﬀect, we take these results as suggestive evidence that
higher salaries induce both selection and behavioral eﬀects.
Smoothness condition and other potential confounds
The general concern with any regression discontinuity design is the possibility that some unobserved
determinant is also discontinuous at the various cutoﬀ points. Although we cannot directly test
this assumption, we can gain some insights by examining whether other observable characteristic
have discontinuous breaks at the cutoﬀs. Figure 4, panels A-D, present a series of municipal char-
acteristics plotted again population. Each ﬁgure depicts population cell means of the municipal
characteristic for the ﬁrst three population thresholds (which represents 96 percent of the observa-
tions) along with the ﬁtted values of a locally weighted regression calculated with each segment.34
Consider, for example, log income per capita, which is a strong predictor of both the number of
bills that were submitted and approved in a municipality’s legislative branch. As Figure 4 depicts,
income per capita is smooth across each of the three cutoﬀ points. We also graph the following
pre-determined characteristics: literacy rate, average private sector wage, and income inequality.35
In general, the ﬁgures show small diﬀerences at each threshold points.
Table 11 illustrates a similar point by testing whether the population cutoﬀs are signiﬁcant for
a larger set of municipal and mayor characteristics. The table reports a series of regressions where
the dependent variable listed in each column is ﬁt to equation (2). Overall, the table conﬁrms that
there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences at cutoﬀ points for various characteristics of the municipality.
The only exception is income inequality as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient.
The results presented in Table 11 address two other potential concerns. If the legislatures that
oﬀered higher wages also provided other non-wage job attributes that directly aﬀect the utility of
politicians, then we might be overestimating the eﬀects of wages on performance and selection. But
34We excluded the 4th and 5th cutoﬀs for presentational purposes. To include these additional observations does
not aﬀect the results.
35Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2008) ﬁnd that members of the Italian parliament who have higher
wages outside of Parliament submit less bills. The plot of average private sector wages suggest that this is not a
concern, even though it would imply that our estimates are lower bounds.
25as columns 16 and 17 demonstrate, there are no discontinuities in the two principal non-pecuniary
features of the legislature: number assistants and number hours the legislature is open.36
Another concern, which would lead us to overestimate the eﬀects of wages, is if the discontinu-
ities in the salaries also created discontinuities in the returns to holding oﬃce either in the private
sector or in higher public oﬃces. While it is diﬃcult to test this hypothesis without wage for politi-
cians who have left oﬃce, it appears unlikely given the smoothness in private sector wages and
income per capita for municipalities near the threshold. Moreover, Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo
(2005) ﬁnd that the eﬀects of an increase in wages on the value of a congressional seat are actually
quite small.
Speciﬁcation Tests
Given the diﬀerences in income inequality across the third population threshold and some of the
other slight diﬀerences in the observable characteristics, we re-estimate all the models presented
in Tables 3-8 including a ﬂexible-functional form for each of our control variables (a fourth-order
polynomial). The results are presented in column 1 of Table 12, where each coeﬃcient is the IV
estimate of the dependent variables listed in each row on log wages. As column 1 reports, the
estimates are not only similar, but in some cases measured with more precision.
The other columns of Table 12 test whether our results are sensitive to the functional form
assumption of a linear spline. In columns 2-5 we present IV estimates of a model where instead of
allowing diﬀerent slopes in each side of the discontinuities we control for a fourth degree polynomial
in population (i.e. in model 2, f(P) = g(P) =
P
i = 14Pi), and again use the cutoﬀs as the excluded
instruments. In this model, unlike the linear spline where the identiﬁcation is limited to the cutoﬀ
points, it imposes additional structure by assuming a constant treatment eﬀect.37
As seen in Column 2, virtually all of the results are qualitatively similar. In general the point
estimates are slightly larger and more precisely estimated.38 In the remaining columns of Table
12, we re-estimate this model restricting the sample to the set of observations that are 5 and 10
36Each regression that has been presented has controlled for these features of the legislature.
37See Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) and Lee (2008) for the application of such models.
38Only in the case of estimating the eﬀects of salaries on the share of female legislators do we ﬁnd contradictory
results. Under this alternative model, one might conclude that higher wages decreased the share of female legislators.
26percent above and below the cutoﬀ points. The point estimates are consistent with the previous
results, although as expected, with few observations we lose quite a bit of precision.
6 Conclusions
Despite the general consensus that good governance matters for economic development, there is
much less agreement on which aspects of governance are important or how it can be improved. The
existing political economy literature has mostly focused on how incentives shape the quality of gov-
ernment. But recent studies have introduced an important role for political selection. Institutions
and policies are shaped by those holding power, so improvements in governance may require good
leaders, persons of character and wisdom (Besley 2006).
While there has been a growing theoretical literature that examines how monetary rewards to
politicians aﬀect political selection (Caselli and Morelli (2004), Matozzi and Merlo (2007)), data
limitations and identiﬁcation concerns have limited the empirical tests of these models. Moreover,
little is know about how monetary rewards aﬀect politicians’ performance (Besley 2006). In this
paper, we estimate the eﬀects of monetary rewards on political selection and legislative performance
using an identiﬁcation strategy that overcomes many prevailing limitations. The empirical analysis
exploits discontinuities in the wages of local politicians across Brazil’s municipal governments that
are based on population thresholds. We ﬁnd that among municipalities that oﬀer higher wages more
educated candidates run for oﬃce, and this leads to an increase in the share of elected legislators
with at least a high school education. Higher wages also encourages politicians to stay in oﬃce
longer resulting in a higher share of experienced legislators. The ﬁndings that higher wages attract
better quality politicians are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Caselli and Morelli (2004)
and Besley (2004).
In addition to the positive selection of candidates, we ﬁnd that wages also aﬀect politicians’
performance. Among municipalities that oﬀer higher wages, politicians submit and approve more
legislative bills. This is consistent with an increase in eﬀort induced by the higher future value
of holding oﬃce. In Brazil, legislators also signal eﬀort by providing petitions for public works
and improvement in public services for their voters. We ﬁnd that in municipalities with higher
27salaries, there is an increase in the number of schools, local clinics and an improvement in their
infrastructure.
In sum, this paper provides evidence that improving ﬁnancial incentives can improve the quality
of government, at least in a local context. Higher wages attract better politicians, induces more
eﬀort, which ultimately leads to more public good provision. This occurs even in an environment
where agents are motivated by other aspects of the position they hold: ego-rents, ideology, intrin-
sic motivations (Benabou and Tirole (2003); (Besley and Ghatak 2005)). However, whether this
increase in performance is due to the positive selection of politicians or the incentive eﬀects of
higher wage is diﬃcult to identify. The eﬀects of wages on politicians’ performance are robust to
changes in the composition of the observable characteristics of the legislature, suggesting that the
eﬀects are not exclusively due to selection. Future research should focus on the complementarity
of improvements in selection and the adoption of appropriate incentives for elected politicians to
improve public service provision.
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32Appendix A: Data Sources
The data used in the paper comes from a variety of sources. The data is at the level of the
municipality, the lowest government unit below a state in Brazil. The main data source is the
legislative census collected during 2005 by the Interlegis, a branch of Brazil’s senate. Although
Brazil’s had 5,564 municipalities recorded as of 2005 by Brazil’s Statistical Oﬃce (IBGE), the
legislative census only recorded information from 5,414 municipalities. Next, we describe the source
of each variable used in the analysis.
Legislature characteristics: Characteristics of the legislature come from the 2005 legislative
census. Next to the answers to the questions on the wages there was a question to whether the
person answering the question was sure about the wages. We restricted our analysis to answers
where the informant was sure about the wage and removed some remaining outliers that represented
less than 1 percent of the sample. The variables used in the analysis are as follows: Legislator’s
salary – monthly salary paid to local legislators, expressed in Reais; Number of legislators – the
size of the legislature in 2005; Weekly hours – the number of hours per week the legislature is open;
Assistants per legislator – the average number of assistants each legislator has; Bills submitted per
legislator – the number of bills submitted in 2005 divided by the size of the legislature; Bills approved
per legislator – the number of bills approved divided by the size of the legislature; Functioning
Commission – an indicator variable for whether the legislature has a commission that functions;
% female legislator – the number of female legislators divided by the size of the legislature; %
legislators age < 40 – share of the legislature that is less than 40 years old;% legislators age 40−49
– share of the legislature that is between 40 − 49 years old;% legislators age > 49 – share of the
legislature that is older than 40 years old;% legislators in 1-2 mandate – share of the legislature
with 1-2 terms of experience; % legislators in 3-7 mandate – share of the legislature with 3-7 terms
of experience; Years of schooling – the average years of schooling of legislators.
Politician’s Characteristics: the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) provides basic demo-
graphic information on each candidate that ran in the 2004 municipal elections. These data is
available at www.tse.gov.br. We use this information to create the following municipal level in-
dicators: Number of candidates per seat – the number of candidates that ran for local legislator
divided by the size of the legislature; Age – the average age of the candidates that ran for oﬃce in
2004; % female – the share of candidates that were female; Years of Schooling – the average years
of schooling for the candidates.
Municipal demographic characteristics: Demographic characteristics of the municipality
come from 2000 population census, available at IBGE (www.ibge.gov.br). The estimate for the 2003
population was obtained from the IBGE inter-census population estimates. The variables used in
the analysis are: % Urban population – the number of inhabitants that live in urban areas divided
by the population; Gini coeﬃcient – income inequality based on household income in 2000; Literacy
Rate – share of the population that is literate; % households with electricity – share of households
33with access to electricity; Household income per capita – Total household income divided by the
number of persons residing in the household.
Municipal institutional and public management characteristics: the 2002 and 2005
surveys of the Perﬁl dos Munic´ ıpios Brasileiros: Gest˜ ao P´ ublica provide information on various
aspects of the public administration, such as budgetary and planning procedures, the number of
public employees. It also provides us with structural features such as the existence of local radio
and the presence of a judge and public prosecutors.
Municipal public ﬁnance information: the National Treasury (Secretaria do Tesouro)
provides information of spending and revenues through the FINBRA dataset. It contains municipal
spending by categories and revenues by sources (i.e. local taxes, intergovernmental transfers). See
www.tesouro.com.br
Private sector wages: the RAIS provides information of public and private sector wages for
all (formal) ﬁrms in Brazil. We use this data to construct a measure of the average wage of private
sector employees in municipalities.
School data: information on the number of primary schools (Ensino fundamental), their
characteristics (whether they have a science or computer lab), and their teacher’s characteristics is
available from Edudata (www.edudata.gov.br), based on yearly school census undertaken by INEP.
Health data: information on the number of clinics managed by the municipal government
and the number of doctors was taken from the Cadastro Nacional de Estabelecimentos de Sa´ ude
(CNES). The information is only available at www.datasus.gov.br for 2006. Data on the average
number of medical visits for 2004 and 2006, was obtained from the Indicadores do Pacto de Aten¸ c˜ ao
B´ asica 2006 and are available at www.datasus.gov.br.
34Appendix B: Examples from Legislators’ Webpages
Vereadora Ana Selma, Cˆ amara Municipal de Cabo de Santo Agostinho, PE
http://anaselma.blogspot.com/
Vereadora Ana Selma visita Cidade Garapu
Na sexta-feira passada, 22, Ana Selma e equipe estiveram, mais uma vez, em visita ao Loteamento
Cidade Garapu. Na oportunidade, foram distribu´ ıdos panﬂetos, cujo teor tem o objetivo de prestar
contas aos moradores da localidade sobre as iniciativas da Vereadora nos ´ ultimos trˆ es anos. Presen¸ ca
constante no Loteamento Cidade Garapu, a Vereadora Ana Selma tem se colocado ao lado dos
moradores na luta por melhorias para o Bairro, realizando visitas aos moradores; Gabinete na Rua
e reuni˜ oes com lideran¸ cas e representantes de entidades.
Veja algumas das iniciativas da Vereadora na Cˆ amara para Garapu:
• Indica¸ c˜ ao solicitando a constru¸ c˜ ao de uma Escola de Ensino Fundamental e Educa¸ c˜ ao
Infantil;
• Indica¸ c˜ ao solicitando providˆ encias para instala¸ c˜ ao de um Posto do Programa Sa´ ude da
Fam´ ılia - PSF;
• Indica¸ c˜ ao solicitando a intensiﬁca¸ c˜ ao de rondas policiais no Loteamento Cidade Garapu
e adjacˆ encias;
• Indica¸ c˜ ao solicitando a instala¸ c˜ ao de abrigos para a espera do transporte coletivo;
Vereador Rom´ erio, Cˆ amara Municipal de Resende, RJ
http://www.vereadorromerio.blogspot.com/
Luta por melhor qualidade na educa¸ c˜ ao
Ao longo do seu mandato, Rom´ erio, conseguiu a aprova¸ c˜ ao de diversas indica¸ c˜ oes que trariam mais
qualidade ` a Educa¸ c˜ ao P´ ublica no Munic´ ıpio, dentre elas temos:
• A aquisi¸ c˜ ao de jornais e revistas para as bibliotecas das escolas;
• Implanta¸ c˜ ao do ensino de inform´ atica desde a 5 s´ erie at´ e o 3 ano do ensino m´ edio;
• Constru¸ c˜ ao de laborat´ orios de ciˆ encias e inform´ atica nas escolas, entre outras.
35Infelizmente, nada foi feito pelo Poder Executivo, neste sentido, mas Rom´ erio garante continuar
lutando para diminuir a distˆ ancia entre o ensino p´ ublico e o particular.
Vereador Jos´ e Damaso, Cˆ amara Municipal de Palmas, TO
http://damasovereador.blogspot.com
Este ´ e o blog do vereador Damaso. Aqui vocˆ e vai encontrar as not´ ıcias sobre seu mandato e suas
a¸ c˜ oes em benef´ ıcio da popula¸ c˜ ao palmense.
A exemplo do que ocorreu em 2005, nessa legislatura na Cˆ amara Municipal de Palmas, o vereador
Damaso (PDT) j´ a apresentou diversos requerimentos que levam benef´ ıcios para a regi˜ ao Sul de
Palmas:
• O vereador tamb´ em apresentou requerimento que solicita a constru¸ c˜ ao de salas para alunos
com necessidades especiais na ´ area dispon´ ıvel da Escola Municipal Tiago Barbosa.
• Em outra propositura, o parlamentar solicitou a implanta¸ c˜ ao de um posto da Pol´ ıcia
Comunit´ aria no setor Taquari.
• Em requerimento apresentado nesta quarta-feira, na Cˆ amara Municipal de Palmas, o vereador
Damaso (PDT) solicitou a abertura de um ambulat´ orio m´ edico em Taquaralto.
36Table 1. Constitutional Amendment No. 25, 2000 
 
0 to 10,000 20% 1927.1 8% 75%
10,001 to 50,000 30% 2890.6 8% 75%
50,001 to 100,000 40% 3854.2 8% 75%
100,001 to 300,000 50% 4817.7 7% 75%
300,001 to 500,000 60% 5781.2 6% 75%
500,000 plus 75% 7226.6 5% 75%
Maximum salary 









spending as a proportion 
of revenues
Notes: The population brackets and the caps on the salaries are defined by the Constitutional Amendment No. 25, 2000. The 
approximate salaries in 2004 are calculated based on the salary of Federal Deputies of R$ 12,847.2. The maximum legislative 
spending is defined as a proportion of revenues, defined as the sum of tax revenues and intergovernmental transfers in the 
previous year. 
  Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Quantiles
Variable Mean S.D. 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Legislature characteristics:
Number legislators 9.26 1.45 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
Legislator wages 1740.03 1116.50 750.00 950.00 1400.00 2300.00 2950.00
Weekly hours 10.71 7.58 4.00 8.00 8.00 12.00 20.00
Assistants per legislator 0.51 0.78 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.56 1.00
Bills submitted per legislator 0.91 2.05 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.89 2.11
Bills approved per legislator 0.73 1.44 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.78 1.67
Functioning commissions (1/0) 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Legislators Characteristics:
% female legislators 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.30
% legislators aged <40 0.36 0.24 0.00 0.22 0.33 0.56 0.67
% legislators aged 40-49 0.41 0.24 0.00 0.22 0.44 0.56 0.67
% legislators aged >49 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.27 0.44
% legislators in 1-2 mandate 0.72 0.23 0.44 0.56 0.78 0.89 1.00
% legislators in 3-7 mandate 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44
Years of schooling 9.77 3.52 5.56 8.36 10.61 12.11 13.17
Candidates Characteristics:
Number of candidates per seat 6.24 3.81 2.56 3.44 5.11 7.90 11.56
Age 42.52 2.38 39.46 40.93 42.57 44.16 45.48
% female 0.21 0.93 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.16 0.12
Years of schooling 9.08 1.56 7.02 8.00 9.13 10.22 11.08
Municipal Characteristics:
Average municipal wages 655.32 201.68 449.65 522.44 623.49 744.32 879.70
Population in 2003 (1000s) 26.45 108.29 3.04 4.98 10.24 21.40 46.54
% Urban population 0.61 0.24 0.28 0.42 0.61 0.80 0.92
Gini coefficient 0.56 0.06 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.60 0.63
Literacy rate 78.19 12.47 59.83 67.96 81.97 88.30 92.26
% households with electricity 86.86 16.56 60.56 80.65 94.49 98.82 99.71
Household income per capita 170.02 94.52 65.82 86.63 158.75 232.22 293.36
% Public employees 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
Spending per capita 884.9 460.0 491.5 587.9 761.0 1040.6 1429.6
Revenues per capita 1107.0 647.9 591.4 712.9 939.2 1304.9 1828.8
 
Notes:  This table reports the mean political and socio-economic characteristics of the all the municipalities in our sample.  Column 1 reports the 
mean of each variable and column 1 reports the standard deviation. The characteristics of the legislature are based on 2005 Brazilian Legislative 
Census (Censo do Legislativo). The candidate characteristics were constructed using data from Brazil’s electoral commission (Tribunal Superior 
Eleitoral: http://www.tse.gov.br/index.html). The socio-economic characteristics were constructed using data from Brazil’s statistical bureau 
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica:  http://www.ibge.gov.br).  For more information on the variables see the data appendix. Table 3. The Effects of Politicians’ Wages on Candidate Entry - OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log wages 2.976 2.702 0.834 0.719 -0.099 -0.081 0.098 0.081 -0.02 -0.013 0.646 0.819
 [0.144]*** [0.123]*** [0.049]*** [0.043]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.072]*** [0.074]***
Population (1/100000) 1.479 1.107 0.375 0.184 0 -0.015 0.029 0.015 -0.001 0.001 0 0.166
  [0.317]*** [0.259]*** [0.062]*** [0.033]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.055]***
Hours functioning legislature 0.014 0.004 0.007 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 -0.009 -0.006
[0.007]** [0.006] [0.003]*** [0.002]* [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]* [0.000] [0.004]** [0.004]
Assistants per legislator 0.584 0.45 0.245 0.163 -0.022 -0.015 0.022 0.015 -0.007 -0.005 0.102 0.086
  [0.106]*** [0.094]*** [0.041]*** [0.032]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.035]*** [0.036]**
Log income per capita -0.697 0.33 -0.011 0.014 0.007 0.733
  [0.166]*** [0.084]*** [0.009] [0.009] [0.004]* [0.150]***
% urban population 4.154 1.507 -0.183 0.18 -0.076 -0.641
[0.197]*** [0.099]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.005]*** [0.192]***
Gini -0.861 1.407 -0.189 0.187 -0.022 -0.988
[0.722] [0.353]*** [0.039]*** [0.038]*** [0.018] [0.637]
% households with energy -1.179 1.237 -0.081 0.079 0.005 1.434
[0.286]*** [0.166]*** [0.018]*** [0.017]*** [0.009] [0.309]***
% literate 5.781 0.772 -0.043 0.048 0.008 1.139
[0.644]*** [0.349]** [0.037] [0.037] [0.018] [0.608]*
Log (wages municipality) 1.322 -0.03 0.009 -0.011 -0.007 -0.744
[0.193]*** [0.088] [0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.167]***
Observations 4891 4891 4889 4889 4891 4891 4891 4891 4891 4891 4889 4889
R-squared 0.44 0.54 0.2 0.38 0.21 0.31 0.21 0.32 0.05 0.1 0.04 0.1
Dependent variables:





Average Years of 
Schooling
Share of candidates 
with less than a high 
school education
Share of candidates 
with at least a high 
school education
 
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates for the effects of wages on the characteristics of those that ran for legislature in the 2004 elections. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 




1{x>10,000} 0.208 0.213 0.213
 [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]***
1{x>50,000} -0.055 -0.027 0.019
 [0.037] [0.035] [0.029]
1{x>100,000} 0.113 0.127 0.231
 [0.063]* [0.061]** [0.033]***
1{x>300,000} 0.024 0.048 0.142
 [0.079] [0.084] [0.057]**
1{x>500,000} 0.142 0.102 0.141
[0.214] [0.227] [0.086]
x 4.932 4.406 4.406
 [0.275]*** [0.277]*** [0.277]***
(x-10,000)*1{x>10,000} -3.054 -2.669 -2.672
 [0.286]*** [0.287]*** [0.287]***
(x-50,000)*1{x>50,000} -1.558 -1.477 -1.715







Municipal characteristics No Yes Yes
Observations 4894 4894 4894
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 6 70 . 6 80 . 6 8
F-test 29.10 29.72 39.00
  (P-values) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Log wages
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimate of the effects of the population cutoff on log wages. The running variable x refers to 
the population in 2003. All regressions control for the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per 
legislator from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo do Legislativo). Municipal Characteristics include Log household 
income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population and Log average wages 
in municipality. All regressions control for log(average wage in private and public sector in municipality). * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The 
reported F-test refers to the cut-off indicators. Table 5. The Effects of Politicians’ Wages on Candidate Entry – TSLS 
 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log wages 1.463 1.334 0.619 0.625 -0.064 -0.069 0.066 0.072 -0.027 -0.029 -0.988 -1.015
[0.598]** [0.547]** [0.352]* [0.318]** [0.037]* [0.035]** [0.037]* [0.035]** [0.017] [0.017]* [0.601] [0.586]*
F-test 29.66 29.56 29.44 29.35 29.66 29.56 29.66 29.56 29.66 29.56 29.44 29.35
(exc. instruments)
Municipal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4891 4891 4889 4889 4891 4891 4891 4891 4891 4891 4889 4889
 
Total Number of 
Candidates per Seat
Average Years of 
Schooling
Share of candidates 
with less than a high 
school education
Share of candidates 
with at least a high 
school education




Notes: The table reports the IV estimates for the effects of wages on the characteristics of those that ran for legislature in the 2004 elections.  All regressions control for the number of 
hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. The Log wages refer to legislators' wages from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo do Legislativo). 
Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population, log average wage in 
private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. 
The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments.Table 6. The Effects of Politicians’ Wages on Candidate Selection 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Panel A: IV estimates
Log Wages 0.364 0.395 -0.067 -0.074 0.113 0.124 1.009 0.913 -0.114 -0.114 0.145 0.141 0.04 0.045 1.011 0.551
[0.153]** [0.150]*** [0.057] [0.056] [0.045]** [0.044]*** [0.857] [0.836] [0.077] [0.074] [0.076]* [0.073]* [0.031] [0.031] [2.847] [2.787]
F-test 29.83 29.72 29.83 29.72 29.83 29.72 29.79 29.65 29.79 29.65 29.83 29.72 29.83 29.72 29.83 29.72
(excl. instruments)
Panel B: OLS estimates
Log Wages 0.176 0.185 -0.05 -0.049 0.051 0.053 0.805 0.696 -0.123 -0.093 0.113 0.09 -0.004 -0.009 -0.892 -0.521
[0.022]*** [0.025]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.116]*** [0.118]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.003] [0.004]** [0.381]** [0.398]
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.06 0.13 0 0.02 0 0.03
Municipal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4893 4893 4893 4893 4893 4893 4894 4894 4894 4894
 
Average Number of 
Terms
Share of legislators 
with 1-2 terms 
Share of legislators 
with 3-7 terms 
Average Education
Share of legislators  
with less than high 
school
Share of legislators  
with at least high 
school




Notes: The table reports the IV and OLS estimates for the effects of wages on the characteristics of those that were elected as legislators in the 2004 elections.  All regressions control for 
the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. The Log wages refer to legislators' wages from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo 
do Legislativo). Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population, log 
average wage in private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 
1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 
1{x>500,000}. The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments.Table 7. The Effects of Politicians’ Wages on Legislative Productivity 
 
( 1 )( 2 ) ( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 ) ( 7 )( 8 )
Panel A: IV estimates
Log Wages 0.466 0.436 0.495 0.506 0.275 0.297 0.208 0.206
[0.254]* [0.251]* [0.263]* [0.264]* [0.096]*** [0.099]*** [0.097]** [0.098]**
F-test 27.18 26.63 25.29 24.51 20.62 19.91 29.83 29.72
(exc. instruments)
Panel B: OLS estimates
Log Wages 0.531 0.502 0.438 0.411 -0.022 -0.023 0.101 0.09
[0.044]*** [0.041]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]*** [0.012]***
R-squared 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03
Municipal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4471 4471 4216 4216 3392 3392 4894 4894
 
Dependent variable:
Log Number of Bill 
Submitted
Log Number of Bill 
Approved
Share of Bills Approved Functioning Commission
Notes: The table reports the IV and OLS estimates for the effects of wages on legislative productivity.  The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the log of one plus the number 
of bills submitted. The dependent variable in columns 3-4 is the log of one plus the number of bills approved.   All regressions control for the number of hours the legislature 
functions per week and assistants per legislator. The Log wages refer to legislators' wages from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo do Legislativo). Municipal 
Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population, log average wage in private and 
public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard 
errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. The 





























( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
Panel A: IV estimates
Log Wages 2.186 0.039 0.106 0.027 0.175 0.642 0.522
[1.100]** [0.020]** [0.049]** [0.050] [0.052]*** [0.278]** [0.236]**
F-test 26.21 26.21 26.21 24.52 27.31 28.59 30.23
(exc. instruments)
Panel B: OLS estimates
Log Wages 0.11 0.003 0.021 0.019 0.01 0.013 0.04
[0.209] [0.004] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009] [0.051] [0.040]
R-squared 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.31 0.01
Municipal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4542 4542 4542 3814 4015 4859 4875
 
Education Health
Notes: The table reports the IV estimates for the effects of wages on provision of public goods.  The dependent variables in columns 1-4 and 7 refer to the change from 2004-2006. 
The dependent variables in columns 5 and 6 are the levels in 2006. All regressions control for the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. 
The Log wages refer to legislators' wages from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo do Legislativo). Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, 
% urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population, log average wage in private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in 
population.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used 
are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments. 
  Table 9:  The Effects of Wages and Legislators' Characteristics on Legislative Performance 
Dependent variable:
Log number of 
Bill Submitted
Log number of 
Bill Approved







Change in share 
of schools with a 
science lab
Change in share 
of schools with a 
computer lab
Change in share 
of teachers with 
a college degree
Number of 





Change in the 
average number 
of doctor visits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Log Wages 0.389 0.466 0.299 0.219 2.186 0.04 0.113 0.031 0.179 0.573 0.542
[0.253] [0.266]* [0.099]*** [0.100]** [1.105]** [0.020]** [0.050]** [0.050] [0.053]*** [0.280]** [0.240]**
Share of legislator with 3 or more terms 0.142 0.09 -0.033 -0.113 0.571 -0.011 -0.024 -0.039 -0.023 0.257 -0.262
[0.095] [0.098] [0.030] [0.032]*** [0.428] [0.008] [0.015] [0.017]** [0.019] [0.097]*** [0.079]***
Share of female legislators -0.345 -0.334 -0.029 -0.006 -0.389 -0.009 0.011 -0.012 -0.018 -0.281 0.019
[0.119]*** [0.132]** [0.048] [0.044] [0.525] [0.011] [0.023] [0.025] [0.025] [0.123]** [0.114]
Share of legislator with at least high school 0.231 0.217 0.015 0.012 0.059 0.001 -0.019 0.006 -0.003 0.287 0.075
[0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.019] [0.019] [0.251] [0.005] [0.010]* [0.011] [0.010] [0.053]*** [0.049]
Average age of legislators -0.001 -0.004 0.00 0.00 -0.022 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.002 0.001
[0.001] [0.002]** [0.000] [0.000] [0.010]** [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]* [0.001]
Municipal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4471 4216 3392 4894 4542 4542 4542 3814 4015 4859 4875
   
Notes: The table reports the IV estimates for the effects of wages and legislators’ characteristics on legislative productivity and provision of public goods.  The dependent variables 
in columns 1-4 and 7 refer to the change from 2004-2006. The dependent variables in columns 5 and 6 are the levels in 2006. All regressions control for the number of hours the 
legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. The Log wages refer to legislators' wages from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo do Legislativo). 
Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population, log average wage in 
private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. 
The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments. 
 
  Table 10:  The Effects of Wages and Legislators' Characteristics on Legislative Productivity by Political Competition 
Dependent variable:
25% 75% 25% 75% 25% 75% 25% 75%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Wages 0.325 0.89 0.103 1.038 0.333 0.439 0.352 0.135
[0.838] [0.461]* [0.820] [0.517]** [0.311] [0.176]** [0.301] [0.171]
Share of legislator with 3 or more terms 0 0.103 -0.046 -0.084 -0.06 -0.028 -0.138 -0.072
[0.210] [0.177] [0.193] [0.177] [0.076] [0.065] [0.078]* [0.058]
Share of female legislators -0.777 -0.476 -0.79 -0.446 -0.14 0.113 0.023 0.03
[0.243]*** [0.247]* [0.259]*** [0.286] [0.110] [0.112] [0.101] [0.080]
Share of legislator with at least high school 0.26 0.276 0.307 0.208 0.051 0.011 0.012 0.026
[0.114]** [0.109]** [0.118]*** [0.104]** [0.046] [0.039] [0.046] [0.033]
Average age of legislators -0.004 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 0 0 -0.001 -0.002
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003]** [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]***
Municipal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1040 1110 977 1056 744 894 1176 1193
 
Log Number of Bill Submitted Log number of Bill Approved Share of Bills Approved Functioning Commission
 
Notes: The table reports the IV estimates for the effects of wages on legislative productivity controlling for the characteristics of the legislators.  The columns denoted by 25% 
estimate the results for the sample of municipalities in the bottom quartile of political competition, as measured by the effective number of political parties that participated in the 
2000 elections. The columns denoted by 75% estimate the results for the sample of municipalities in the upper quartile of political competition.  The dependent variable in columns 
1 and 2 is the log of one plus the number of bills submitted. The dependent variable in columns 3-4 is the log of one plus the number of bills approved.   All regressions control for 
the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. The Log wages refer to legislators' wages from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo 
do Legislativo). Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population, log 
average wage in private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 
1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 
1{x>500,000}. The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments. 
 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1{x>10,000} 0.011 0.02 -0.004 -0.016 0.004 -0.69 0.004 -0.088 -0.271 0.027 -0.017 0.21 -0.016 -0.626
 [0.034] [0.033] [0.003] [0.013] [0.010] [1.735] [0.007] [0.257] [0.568] [0.026] [0.016] [0.430] [0.022] [0.379]*
1{x>50,000} -0.078 0.014 -0.018 -0.022 0.002 2.713 0.005 -0.528 1.863 0.045 0.006 -0.362 0.094 -1.353
 [0.033]** [0.076] [0.007]** [0.026] [0.020] [3.585] [0.016] [0.435] [1.322] [0.059] [0.037] [1.271] [0.193] [1.150]
1{x>100,000} -0.004 -0.001 -0.008 0.01 -0.023 1.083 -0.01 1.416 3.988 -0.092 -0.002 1.082 0.023 -1.754
 [0.056] [0.101] [0.011] [0.029] [0.020] [4.312] [0.018] [0.664]** [1.919]** [0.098] [0.043] [1.740] [0.394] [2.327]
1{x>300,000} -0.018 0.059 -0.022 -0.005 -0.004 7.759 0.024 -0.21 2.072 -0.212 0.066 -0.448 -0.28 4.713
 [0.093] [0.182] [0.019] [0.023] [0.010] [3.676]** [0.016] [1.947] [3.828] [0.161] [0.061] [4.201] [0.873] [6.705]
1{x>500,000} -0.095 -0.174 0.033 0.045 0.003 0.291 -0.008 -2.47 3.203 -0.565 0.186 -5.675 -1.969 6.034
[0.263] [0.448] [0.038] [0.035] [0.006] [5.882] [0.032] [3.061] [9.329] [0.471] [0.190] [9.689] [1.950] [12.773]
x 1.898 -2.895 0.478 0.712 -0.708 -178.844 -0.832 16.838 17.494 -1.356 0.274 -11.922 1.865 17.788
 [0.679]*** [0.474]*** [0.050]*** [0.202]*** [0.151]*** [25.983]*** [0.104]*** [4.087]*** [8.862]** [0.410]*** [0.239] [6.027]** [0.282]*** [5.320]***
(x-10,000)*1{x>10,000} -1.558 3.618 -0.414 -0.189 0.819 194.57 0.918 -10.474 -14.26 1.386 -0.35 32.675 -0.462 -7.685
 [0.683]** [0.494]*** [0.052]*** [0.208] [0.155]*** [26.861]*** [0.108]*** [4.184]** [9.165] [0.423]*** [0.249] [6.412]*** [0.316] [5.618]
(x-50,000)*1{x>50,000} 0.115 0.068 -0.083 -0.234 0.099 15.169 0.122 -7.041 -7.321 0.158 0.229 -0.646 -0.519 -0.757
 [0.136] [0.286] [0.028]*** [0.091]** [0.071] [13.316] [0.057]** [1.771]*** [5.272] [0.238] [0.129]* [4.674] [0.778] [5.281]
(x-100,000)*1{x>100,000} -0.403 -0.714 0.021 -0.254 -0.191 -29.145 -0.197 0.467 2.151 -0.193 -0.17 -17.891 -0.558 -6.598
 [0.122]*** [0.258]*** [0.026] [0.077]*** [0.061]*** [11.741]** [0.049]*** [1.602] [4.909] [0.226] [0.115] [4.326]*** [0.858] [5.328]
(x-300,000)*1{x>300,000} 0.057 0.097 0.01 -0.045 -0.02 -5.553 -0.016 1.484 1.724 0.371 -0.077 4.991 0.03 -3.721
 [0.150] [0.291] [0.023] [0.027] [0.011]* [3.945] [0.020] [2.311] [5.234] [0.273] [0.107] [6.554] [1.262] [8.715]
(x-500,000)*1{x>500,000} -0.103 -0.161 -0.009 0.009 0.001 3.474 0.005 -1.226 -0.035 -0.367 0.094 -6.481 -0.378 0.061
 [0.144] [0.285] [0.021] [0.022] [0.004] [3.006] [0.017] [2.263] [5.108] [0.263] [0.099] [6.433] [1.201] [8.542]
Observations 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4464 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.01 0 0.28 0.2 0.08
F-test 1.28 0.24 2.00 0.98 0.46 1.25 0.88 1.86 1.06 0.93 0.69 0.6 0.29 0.88








































Notes: the dependent variable is the log os legislators' wages. The running variable x refers to the population in 2003. All regressions control for the number of hours the legislature functions per week 
and assistants per legislator from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo do Legislativo). * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets. The reported F-test refers to the cut-off indicators.










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Entry
Number of Candidates per Seat 1.582 3.758 4.837 4.214
[0.529]*** [0.223]*** [1.120]*** [0.957]***
(499) (719)
Average Years of Schooling 0.648 1.357 1.088 1.391
[0.302]** [0.096]*** [0.395]*** [0.334]***
(499) (719)
Less than a high school education -0.069 -0.144 -0.114 -0.134
[0.033]** [0.010]*** [0.044]*** [0.036]***
(499) (719)
At least a high school education 0.076 0.137 0.118 0.139
[0.033]** [0.010]*** [0.045]*** [0.037]***
(499) (719)
Share of male candidates -0.028 -0.02 -0.019 -0.008
[0.016]* [0.005]*** [0.019] [0.016]
(499) (719)
Average Age -0.738 1.527 0.153 0.321
[0.567] [0.169]*** [0.656] [0.545]
(499) (719)
Panel B:: Selection
Average Number of Terms 0.382 0.233 0.256 0.357
[0.147]*** [0.060]*** [0.256] [0.220]
(499) (719)
% Legislators with 1-2 terms of tenure -0.078 -0.034 -0.078 -0.109
[0.055] [0.018]* [0.081] [0.069]
(499) (719)
% legislators with 3-7 terms of tenure 0.122 0.053 0.054 0.09
[0.043]*** [0.015]*** [0.064] [0.055]
(499) (719)
Average education  1.005 1.777 0.846 1.876
[0.818] [0.330]*** [1.946] [1.656]
(499) (719)
Share with less than high school -0.105 -0.178 -0.091 -0.125
[0.072] [0.021]*** [0.097] [0.081]
(499) (719)
Share with at least high school 0.141 0.209 0.088 0.174
[0.071]** [0.026]*** [0.143] [0.121]
(499) (719)
Share of female legislators 0.038 -0.014 -0.047 -0.054
[0.030] [0.010] [0.042] [0.035]
(499) (719)
Average age  0.849 0.811 -0.257 0.598
[2.738] [1.056] [6.301] [5.118]
(499) (719)
Flexible polynomial on population 
(quartic)
 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel C: legislative productivity
Log number of bills submitted 0.455 0.565 0.577 0.796
[0.244]* [0.102]*** [0.582] [0.484]
(467) (676)
Log number of bills approved 0.511 0.654 1.202 1.161
[0.257]** [0.084]*** [0.359]*** [0.303]***
(442) (642)
Share of bills approved 0.279 0.058 0.141 0.111
[0.096]*** [0.029]** [0.110] [0.096]
(380) (552)
Functioning commission 0.19 0.174 0.108 0.133
[0.095]** [0.029]*** [0.122] [0.101]
(499) (719)
Flexible polynomial on population 
(quartic)
 
Notes: All regressions control for the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. The Log 
wages refer to legislators' wages from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo do Legislativo). Municipal Characteristics 
include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population 
and Log average wages in municipality. All regressions control for log(average wage in private and public sector in 
municipality). Column 1 controls for a linear-spline in population and a 4
th order polynomial in all of the municipal 
characteristics list above. Columns 2-4 controls for 4
th order polynomial in population. * indicates statistical significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are 
the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. The reported F-


























FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATORS’ SALARIES 
Notes: Figure shows the distribution of legislators’ salaries for each municipality in our sample. The vertical lines denote 































FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF 2003 POPULATION 
Notes: Figure shows the distribution of the population of each municipality in our sample for the first cutoff points. The 
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FIGURE 3: LEGISLATORS’ SALARIES BY POPULATION 
Notes: Figure shows legislators’ salaries by population. Each figure presents the mean wage for a bin size of 200 
inhabitants (hollow-circles) along with a locally weighted regression calculated within each population segment with a 
bandwidth of 0.5. The vertical lines denote the various cutoff points. 
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FIGURE 4: MUNICIPAL CHARACTERISTICS BY POPULATION 
Notes: The figure shows municipal characteristics by population. Each figure presents the mean of the municipal 
characteristic for a bin size of 200 inhabitants (hollow-circles) along with a locally weighted regression calculated within 
each population segment with a bandwidth of 0.5. The vertical lines denote the various cutoff points. 
 
 